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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY IN TORT-PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL 
ABROGATION OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CONCEPT-Plaintiff's decedent 
was killed by a fall down the elevator shaft of a building owned and main-
tained by the City of Detroit. Plaintiff alleged that defendant city negli-
gently failed to protect and enclose the shaft, in violation of its own 
ordinances, and that such failure was the proximate cause of her husband's 
death. The city moved to dismiss, claiming that it was engaged in a govern-
mental function and therefore was immune from tort liability. On appeal 
from an order dismissing the complaint, held, affirmed by an evenly divided 
court. However, a majority of the court prospectively overruled the judi-
cial doctrine of governmental immunity from ordinary torts. Williams v. 
City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961). 
The principal case is representative of a growing trend on the part of 
state courts and legislatures to reach a new compromise between the 
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common-law concept of sovereign immunity1 and the belief that the risk 
of wrongful injury should not be borne by the individual but by society 
as a whole.2 Interaction of these conflicting views has placed the law of 
sovereign immunity in a state of confusion, for while some jurisdictions 
rigidly adhere to the immunity rule, others have made inroads upon it 
through piecemeal imposition of liability. Many courts, for example, have 
in recent years liberally construed legislative enactments empowering 
specific governmental bodies "to sue and be sued."3 Whereas formerly 
these provisions had been interpreted to waive immunity of the sovereign 
only from suit and not liability,4 now immunity from liability is also held 
to have been waived.5 Judicial attempts have also been made to distinguish 
those functions in which the municipal body is acting in a governmental 
capacity from those in which its activities are proprietary in nature, and 
as such are not granted sovereign immunity.6 However, no satisfactory 
criteria for the distinction have been devised other than vague and general 
guides,7 and, as has been suggested,8 the outcome desired in a particular 
case often influences the classification employed. Another distinction has 
been that made between contract and tort actions, on the theory that an 
award of contract damages indirectly benefits the governmental body by 
encouraging persons to contract with it, while a tort recovery yields no 
1 Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 Durn. &: East. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). See 
also Leflar &: Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363 (1954). 
2 See Fuller &: Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437 
(1941). 
3 Linger v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 158 F. Supp. 900 (\V.D. Pa. 1958) ; 
Lowes v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 125 F. Supp. 681 (M.D. Pa. 1954); Sayreville 
v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 67 N.J. Super. 271, 170 A.2d 523 (1961). See also 
Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1222 (1958) . 
4 Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 254 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1958); 
Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1958) ; Elizabeth 
River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 117 S.E.2d 685 (1961); Wilson v. State 
Highway Comm'r, 174 Va. 82, 4 S.E.2d 746 (1939). 
5 E.g., St. Julian v. State, 82 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 1955) ; Ouzts v. State Highway 
Dep't, 161 S.C. 21, 159 S.E. 457 (1931) . 
6 Bettencourt v. State, 123 Cal. App. 2d 60, 266 P .2d 201 (1954) ; People v. Superior 
Court, 168 P.2d 177 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946), peremptory writ of prohibition denied, 
29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947); Martinson v. City of Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W.2d 
148 (1950); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956); 
Gotcher v. State, 106 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1937) . 
7 Daszkiewicz v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 301 Mich. 212, 3 N .W .2d 71 (1942) • See 
generally Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort 
Liability, 9 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 214 (1942). In 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 29.6, at 
1621 (1956) , the following is submitted as a test for distinguishing governmental from 
proprietary functions: " (1) whether the function is allocated to the municipality for 
its profit or special advantage or whether for the purpose of carrying out the public 
functions of the state without advantage to the city, and (2) whether the function is 
one historically performed by government." 
8 See Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REv. 41, 43 (1949) . 
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such "advantage."9 A "nuisance" theory,10 and an "active wrongdoing" 
test11 have also carved out limited exceptions to the sovereign immunity 
rule. 
But the principal case and similar decisions in Illinois,12 California,13 
and Florida14 have attempted to lay aside these multifarious distinctions 
in favor of a judicial abrogation of the ancient common law immunity 
rule. In so doing, new problems are posed, problems not encountered under 
a rule of immunity. Perhaps the most significant of these is the question 
of what limits, if any, should be placed upon the liability of the formerly 
immune sovereign and its subordinates. The holding in the principal 
case has extended liability, unlimited in amount, not only to the City of 
Detroit, but to every municipal corporation in Michigan regardless of size. 
From what appears, it is conceivable that governmental bodies may also 
be held accountable for the intentional torts of their employees and agents. 
In short, even though the decision expressly exempts from liability dis-
cretionary governmental functions, many of the other traditional safe-
guards on liability have been abandoned despite the fact that experience 
indicates some restraint is required for the protection of public funds, 
especially those of the smaller community.15 In addition, the increased 
liability may necessitate the establishment of appropriate administrative 
facilities or perhaps an independent tribunal to administer liability claims 
effectively. Without a resolution of these problems it will be difficult for 
the broad liability rule to serve as a practicable solution. Thus, a reaction 
from the legislature or the judiciary is likely to follow which will either 
implement the rule and supply the necessary safeguards, or restore the 
o Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 38 Pac. 457 (1894) ; Bush v. State Highway Comm'n, 
329 Mo. 843, 46 S.W.2d 854 (1932) ; Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm'n, 95 
Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937). 
10 See Capozzi v. Waterbury, 115 Conn. 107, 160 Atl. 435 (1932); Windle v. City of 
Springfield, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S.W.2d 61 (1928); Oklahoma City v. Tytenicz, 171 Okla. 
519, 43 P.2d 747 (1935). 
11 Casale v. Housing Authority, 42 N.J. Super. 52, 125 A.2d 895 (1956). See also 
Repko, supra note 7, at 223. 
12 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) • 
13 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 2II, 359 P .2d 457 (1961) . 
14 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) • See also Annot., 
60 A.L.R.2d II93 (1958) . 
11! See Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 
20 A.B.A.J. 747 (1934) . Opponents of the immunity rule, however, contend that liability 
insurance affords at a fixed, predictable cost both protection from overwhelming liability 
and the insurer's services in defending suits against the governmental entity. See Gibbons, 
Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Government, 1959 DUKE 
L.J. 588. See also Leflar &: Kantrowitz, supra note 1, at 1413. Support for this view is 
evidenced by the fact that statutes in some states expressly waive governmental immunity 
to the extent that such liability is within the coverage of a policy of insurance. E.g., 
Ford v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 P .2d 589 (1958) ; Villars v. City of Portsmouth, 
100 N.H. 453, 129 A.2d 914 (1957); Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 414 (1936). 
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immunity doctrine; for such has been the experience in all three of the 
states whose judiciaries purported to establish a broad rule of liability. 
In subsequent decisions, the courts themselves proved reluctant to give 
full force and effect to their prior decisions. The Florida court refused to 
extend liability beyond the scope of its original decision,10 which abolished 
only municipal immunity, leaving the state and its agencies immune as 
before except where liability was imposed by statute.17 Nor would the 
Florida court extend liability to render municipal corporations accountable 
for the intentional torts of their employees.18 In California, the decision 
purportedly overruling sovereign immunity19 was subsequently limited to 
apply only to the torts of agents who acted in a ministerial capacity.20 
So also in Michigan, the ruling of the principal case was later held to 
withdraw immunity only from municipal corporations.21 
Although the judiciary may work to temper the liability rule, a com-
prehensive solution cannot be reached without appropriate legislative 
implementation. For the judiciary lacks the facilities for an examination 
of the social, economic and political considerations which delineate the 
outer limits of liability. Nor can the judiciary provide for uniform ad-
ministrative facilities and procedures, maximum amounts of recovery, the 
creation of a liability fund, or other provisions which the added liability 
may prove desirable.22 These are properly legislative functions. So also, 
authorization for the procurement of liability insurance, now a practical 
necessity for the smaller community with a narrow tax base, is a matter 
usually reserved to the legislature.23 These considerations led the Cali-
fornia legislature to re-enact the doctrine of governmental immunity from 
tort liability as a rule of decision in order to allow itself time to draft ap-
propriate legislation and define certain areas in which immunity would 
continue to exist.24 So also in Illinois, a Torts Law Commission was created2;; 
to recommend legislative change where necessary, and to consider the 
compilation in one code of all laws pertaining to governmental tort lia-
16 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). 
17 Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
18 Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) • 
19 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). 
20 Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465 (1961). 
21 McDowell v. Mackie, 365 Mich. 268, 112 N.W .2d 491 (1961) • 
22 See Justice Schauer's dissenting opinion in Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 
2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). 
23 Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 338 P .2d 808 (Wyo. 1959) . 
24 CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.3. 
25 Ill. Laws 1961, S. Bill No. 229. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.l; ch. 57\/2, 
§ 3a; ch. 105, §§ 12.1-1, 333.2a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961), where immunity was reinstated 
by legislative enactment to counties and certain park and forest preserve districts. 
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bility. Such action exemplifies the special capacity of the legislature 
specifically to define and condition the terms of liability.26 
The model example of such combined legislative and judicial action 
achieving a significant abrogation of immunity is that set by New York, 
which in 1929 adopted a Court of Claims Act abolishing sovereign im-
munity from both suit and liability, and establishing a Court of Claims to 
hear and determine all claims against the state.27 Such rule has been refined 
by subsequent legislative enactments and judicial interpretation28 over a 
period of thirty years to provide a comprehensive pattern of tort liability.29 
The lesson to be drawn from the New York solution is that it will be 
difficult for the doctrine advanced in the principal case to realize fruition 
unaltered by subsequent judicial refinement and legislative implementa-
tion.30 However, the court, having taken action in an area often thought 
to be one of legislative prerogative,31 does impel legislative consideration 
of the problem of sovereign immunity in a new light. In doing so, it poses 
a challenge to the legislature to provide the necessary safeguards and a 
suitable procedural framework for the administration of tort liability,32 a 
challenge now, more than ever, likely to evoke response by way of legisla-
tive action, as those interests which formerly enjoyed immunity and opposed 
the imposition of complete tort liability will undoubtedly be more receptive 
to legislation intended to strike a compromise. 
Donald E. Vacin 
.26 Strauss v. Decatur Park Dist., 177 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ill. 1959); Miller v. City of 
Chicago, 25 Ill. App. 2d 56, 165 N.E.2d 724 (1960); Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 
Wis. 219, 55 N.W.2d 24 (1952). 
27 N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8. See also Vt. Laws 1961, S. Bill No. 124, by which Vermont 
enacted a statutory scheme of similar import • 
.28 New York courts have held that this statute swept away the derivative immunity 
of the state's political subdivisions in Holmes v. County of Erie, 266 App. Div. 220, 42 
N.Y.S.2d 243 (1943), aff'd, 291 N.Y. 798, 53 N.E.2d 369 (1944); and of municipalities in 
Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). 
20 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 5 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). 
See also Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York, A Legislative Challenge, 23 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 278 (1948) • 
30 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 53051; CAL. VEHICLE CoDE § 17001; ILL. STAT. ANN. 
ch. 24, §§ 1-13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961) ; N.Y. MuNic. LAw § 50a; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 701.02 (Page 1953) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.06 (Supp. 1961). 
31 See Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687 (1961); 
Banas v. City of Syracuse, 204 Misc. 201, 125 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1953) . 
32 See Borchard, supra note 15. 
